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ABSTRACT
Far right-wing parties have gained dramatically in many West European countries since
the early 1980s. Recent cross-national studies distinguish between neo-fascist parties, which are
anti-democratic and anti-capitalist, and radical right-wing parties which combine antiimmigration appeals with pro-capitalist, neo-liberal economic positions, social conservatism, and
a basic acceptance of representative democracy. While the former have been stagnant and
unimportant, the latter have been gaining. Yet there are also borderline cases where it is more
difficult to determine whether the party rejects fascism and accepts democracy, a problem which
the theoretical literature has neglected. The far right's success is largely due to the politicization
of immigration issues, political alienation, and backlashes against welfare states.

2
Introduction
1

Once thought to represent a set of cleavages established in the 1920s, West European
party systems recently have undergone important changes. Beginning in the 1970s, leftlibertarian, ecological parties captured small but significant shares of the vote in many countries
and helped to define a new dimension of conflict in many party systems. More recently, far
right-wing parties have gained dramatically, taking votes from established parties and pressing
their issues onto political agendas. Today the most successful of these parties are the Front
National in France and the Freedom Party in Austria, but Denmark, Norway, Italy, Belgium,
Germany, and Sweden have also seen important challenges by far-right parties. Despite
important differences among them, these parties' positions put them in what is commonly
understood as the far-right part of the political spectrum. Much more than established parties,
they favor law-and-order, tax cuts, and limits on immigration, and oppose policies favored by
social-democratic parties (social equality, economic regulation) and by left-libertarian or
ecological parties (a multi-cultural society, women's equality, environmental protection).
By the late 1980s, far-right parties were gaining rapidly in many countries, by attacking
immigration and drawing voters from both the center-right and center-left parties. Their
nationalistic or ethnocentric aspects have come into high relief at a time when efforts at
increasing European integration are proceeding apace. This leads to two sets of questions. First,
how extreme are these parties' goals? To what extent do they accept the main features of the
post-war order in Western Europe -- liberal democratic politics, capitalist market economies, the
post-1945 national borders -- and to what extent do they advocate or intend fundamental changes
in them? To what extent are they in this sense anti-system, or even "fascist"? Second, why have

3
many far-right parties recently gained at the polls, while others have failed?
Single-case studies are a good place to start in answering these questions. These studies
typically characterize a single national-level far-right party, describe its development, and offer
an explanation for its recent success. This literature has offered four different views of the
parties' goals and the reasons for their growth.
2

The first view focuses on immigration. Immigration into Western Europe increased in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially from the former Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe, and the
former Soviet Union. According to the immigration thesis, the social effects of immigration,
along with high levels of economic insecurity, benefitted far-right parties, which argued against
immigration on the basis of its supposed connections with unemployment and crime. In this
view, these are single-issue parties, which represent popular xenophobia.
3

The second explanation rests on political alienation. Many voters' general dissatisfaction
with how established parties have responded to various issues (economic growth, unemployment,
corruption, crime, drugs, immigration) has led them to distrust all established parties and
politicians. The resulting potential for protest voting has been exploited by the far right, aided by
its anti-establishment message and lack of governing experience. The electoral prospects of farright parties depend inversely on the credibility of established parties and political systems, and
does not necessarily signal a deeper movement by voters toward far-right positions on
substantive issues.
The third approach, which is most common in the popular press as well as among some
academic authors, holds that the far-right parties reflect a resurgence, in somewhat new forms, of
4

interwar fascist movements. According to the neo-fascist thesis, successful far-right parties
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today have organizational or personnel connections to pre-1945 Fascists or Nazis, adopt
programs that are similar to fascism, and are attempting to resurrect or create fascist regimes.
Hence they use quasi-fascist appeals to play upon the resentments of the present period, such as
immigration and unemployment, and try especially to mobilize petty bourgeois support.
To make this argument intelligible requires defining "fascism." The debate over the
concept of fascism has shown that important differences exist among supposedly fascist parties
5

and that no definitive set of characteristics will be equally valid in all cases. For example, the
extreme racism of the German National Socialists and the commitment to corporatism by the
Italian Fascists are not general features of all fascist parties, although they may distinguish two
6

sub-types. Nonetheless, a number of features are shared by these two important cases, as well as
many others, and these are adequate for defining a group of fascist parties distinct from other
families of political parties in twentieth-century Western Europe. Therefore, I define fascist
parties as those whose goals focus on national unity against internal and external enemies, empire
or national expansion, an authoritarian state, and a highly state-regulated economy which could
be either capitalist or socialist. In this conception, fascist parties are also distinguished by their
methods of organizing and action, which center on charismatic leadership, mass organizations,
7

close alliances with paramilitary organizations, and violence against political opponents. Hence
"neo-fascist parties" are those which, in the postwar period, have substantially fascist goals and
organizing methods.
The fourth view is that the far-right parties react against the ecological, left-libertarian
8

parties and their issues, which became stronger in the 1980s. According to this view, far-right
parties are part of a backlash against the post-materialist, left-libertarian demands associated with
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the citizen mobilization of the 1970s and '80s (e.g. feminism, gay rights, environmentalism,
multiculturalism, citizen participation) and left-wing ecological parties, which in turn arose
because of post-industrial changes in occupational structures and values. Hence the far-right
parties mobilize voters on the same issues as the left-libertarians by taking opposing positions.
Scholars recently have completed several cross-national comparative studies of the far
right, providing a good opportunity to assess these four approaches and focus attention on some
9

aspects which had been neglected. Two of these are anthologies. The Extreme Right in Europe
10

and the USA, edited by Paul Hainsworth and Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right,
11

edited by Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, are useful references on the nature of postwar, far-right parties in a broad range of countries. They are largely descriptive in intent and
format, although individual chapters often suggest explanations of the success or failure of
particular parties and the introductions to both books provide generalizations. Both of these
books survey a number of European countries, focusing on the most successful far-right parties
in each and also including cases of electorally unsuccessful parties.
The other two books, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe by Hans-Georg
12

Betz and The Radical Right in Western Europe by Herbert Kitschelt (with Anthony J.
13

McGann), offer general theories of the recent rise of far-right parties backed with evidence
from a variety of country studies, although Kitschelt's book relies more heavily on several crossnational data sets. Although they differ in detail and emphasis, Betz and Kitschelt provide
similar and complementary theories of the rise of far-right parties. They reject the neo-fascist
explanation, draw on the immigration and alienation theses with qualifications, and focus on the
political responses to social changes. These books make significant conceptual and theoretical
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contributions, which will probably serve as reference points for the next decade of research into
this phenomenon.
Taken together, this work leads to two main conclusions about far-right parties. First,
their success is inversely related to their proximity to neo-fascist groups or parties. Western
Europe has not experienced an upsurge in neo-fascism, but rather the growth of a new kind, or
new kinds, of radical right-wing parties. Second, the causes of the far-right parties lie in the
responses of both established and challenging political parties to social and political-economic
changes which have altered the conditions of electoral competition.

14

More specifically, these

causes include: the breakdown of traditional cleavages and the rise of issue voting; the crisis of
the welfare state; the perceived failure of established parties to resolve major problems such as
unemployment, corruption, crime, and immigration; increased political alienation; the appeals
made by the far-right parties; and the failure of the mainstream parties to adapt.

A new, democratic radical right, or a revival of old right-wing extremism?
What distinguishes the goals of far-right parties? Three of these books (all but
Encounters) agree that the parties are characterized by nationalism on immigration issues and
neo-liberalism on economics. Beyond that, these works have important disagreements and
sometimes define the phenomenon too broadly. By defining far-right parties in Western Europe
as a single phenomenon, which includes neo-fascist parties or factions together with parties
which accept democracy, markets, and existing national borders, the two anthologies do not
address systematically the relation between these parties and the established system. Indeed, they
may contribute to the common tendency to see all far-right parties as part of the revival of a
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fascist movement.

15

In his introduction to Encounters, Weinberg characterizes these parties as "radical right,"
but the case studies in the book are more heterogenous than the concept suggests (a problem
shared by Hainsworth's The Extreme Right); several cases do not fit the concept at all. A key
part of Weinberg's definition is "radical"; by this is meant that the parties use "dirty tricks" or
violence rather than playing by the rules of the democratic game, are unwilling to compromise on
their goals, and harbor "a desire to shut down the democratic enterprise."

16

However, of the significant contemporary West European parties included in Encounters,
only one is anti-democratic (the British National Front), one accepts democracy (the French Front
National), and the other two are borderline cases. For example, the Front National calls for
stronger authority but does not oppose the Fifth Republic; Safran, in accord with other authors,
concludes that this party supports neo-liberal economic policies "within the existing political
system," along with the strengthening of existing social hierarchies such as traditional families.

17

By contrast, the National Front in Britain is a far-right party which clearly did not accept
the liberal democratic order. While this party's public face emphasized immigration problems,
and compulsory repatriation of non-whites was its main plank, the inner core of the party favored
a National Socialist dictatorship like Hitler's Third Reich. Indeed, the National Front's leaders
John Tyndall and Martin Webster broke from the British National Party in the 1960s because,
although they supported Nazism, they advocated "a covert approach, stressing British roots" in
order to gain popular support.

18

Assessing other far-right parties on the question of democracy is more complex, and
perhaps nowhere more so than in Germany. Ekkart Zimmermann and Thomas Saalfeld analyze
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three German cases, including anti-democratic parties such as the Socialist Reich Party of the
early 1950s and the National Democratic Party, whose support peaked in the late 1960s at 5-10%
of the vote in many states and just under 5% at the national level. These parties were mainly
composed of former Nazi party members and advocated important parts of the Nazi program,
including (in the case of the Reich Party) the centralization of power in a national leader and a
corporate parliament.
Determining positions on democracy is made difficult by the fact that parties which
overtly oppose parliamentary democracy are likely to be banned by the German Constitutional
Court, a fate which befell the Socialist Reich Party and was evaded by the National Democratic
Party only through its lip service in support of the Basic Law. Therefore, party positions
concerning the Nazi regime and Nazi organizations are probably the best evidence of German
far-right parties' orientations toward democracy. By that standard, the Republicans, the third
party in Zimmermann and Saalfeld's chapter, are on the borderline between rejection and
acceptance of democracy. The Republicans' relatively moderate wing, which was led until the
early 1990s by the former Waffen SS officer Franz Schönhuber, presented the Republicans as a
pro-system party and opposed ties to parties which contain many neo-Nazis, but at the same time
the Republicans sought to rehabilitate the Nazi regime's image and to reopen questions about
eastern territory lost in World War II.

19

The Italian Social Movement (since the early 1990s renamed the National Alliance) is
another borderline case. The party is the successor to Mussolini's Fascist Party, but has
undergone divisive conflicts between pro-system and anti-system factions and increasingly has
supported democracy.

20

The Italian Social Movement supported the Christian Democratic
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government against communism in the 1950s, formally decided to accept democracy in 1969,
and vacillated between fundamental opposition and support for the mainstream parties in the
1980s in order to buttress the Socialist against the Communist Party.

21

At the same time, the

presence of many neo-fascist cadre and persistence of fascist ideological traditions in the Italian
Social Movement makes it difficult to consider the party pro-system.

Radical-right vs. neo-fascist parties

The diversity of the far-right parties raises the

question of their relation to fascism, which can best be answered by distinguishing the far-right
parties of contemporary Western Europe according to two ideal types. First, "neo-fascist parties"
have fascist programs, methods, and organizational ties as defined earlier. Second, "radical rightwing parties" call for stronger authority while accepting liberal representative democracy, oppose
immigration and immigrants while accepting existing national borders, and embrace market
economics to a much greater extent than parties of government.

22

It is true that much about the radical-right parties -- their nationalist criticism of ethnic
minorities, populist attacks on the political class, and advocacy of stronger authority -- resembles
the appeals of fascist parties. But the differences between the radical-right and fascist parties are
even larger than the similarities. The radical right's nationalism is focused narrowly on issues
related to immigrants and usually does not include border issues, except for regionalist parties
like the Northern League and Flemish Bloc, which advocate fragmenting rather than expanding
their nations. Their authoritarianism is mild, calling for modifying existing democratic systems
through centralization and stronger leadership rather than fundamental constitutional change.
Furthermore, in the clearest departure from fascist parties, their economic programs are in most
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cases strongly neo-liberal, attacking the welfare state and favoring individual economic freedom.
Finally, the far-right parties are organized as "framework parties," with very strong leaders (Le
Pen, Haider, Bossi, Schönhuber, etc.) and centralized organizations, but minimal member
participation and a nearly exclusive focus on electoral campaigns.
Since both neo-fascist and radical-right parties have focused on immigration and related
issues in recent years, they have often been conflated; moreover, there are also mixed or
borderline cases. But as Kitschelt and Betz both argue, the radical-right parties represent a new
and distinct synthesis of right-wing ideas and practices. This combination of appeals is
exceptional and important not only because it is novel in post-war Western Europe, but also
because it has the potential to build a cross-class alliance between entrepreneurs and the working
class. That potential, of course, brings to mind the efforts of interwar fascist parties to do
something similar, but this resemblance does not by itself obviate the distinctive nature of the
radical right.
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Types of radical-right parties

While the radical-right parties are distinct from neo-fascist

and mainstream conservative parties, there are also important differences between them. For
example, some parties advocate regional interests (e.g. the Northern League, the Flemish Bloc)
while most are nationalist; some are not strongly xenophobic (e.g. the Northern League), while
others are not especially neo-liberal (e.g. the Republicans). To address this problem, Kitschelt
has created a typology which is useful for understanding differences in the parties' social bases
and success as well as their programmatic appeals, in which there are three ideal types of radical
right-wing parties: "new-radical-right," "populist anti-statist," and "welfare-chauvinist" parties.

23

These differ on two basic dimensions: neo-liberalism; and xenophobia combined with
authoritarianism. "Authoritarian" in this context means favoring stronger authority for political
and social institutions, though not necessarily opposing competitive party democracy; here I will
use it interchangeably with "socially conservative" and "law-and-order." The new-radical-right
parties, which, according to Kitschelt, are found in France, Denmark, Norway, and perhaps
Belgium, are neo-liberal on economics, and socially conservative and xenophobic on political
and cultural issues. Thus they form an antipode to the left-libertarian ecological parties, which
promote a multi-cultural society, individual self-expression and citizen participation, and social
solidarity through government regulation and redistribution. By contrast, populist anti-statist
parties, found in Austria and Northern Italy, are economically neo-liberal but not very
xenophobic or socially conservative. Finally, welfare-chauvinist parties, e.g. in Germany, are
socially conservative, culturally xenophobic, and strongly nationalist (hence the term
"chauvinist"), but defend welfare programs rather than advocating neo-liberalism.
The method by which this typology was constructed and tested results in some drawbacks
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as well as advantages. It is derived mainly from factor analyses using the 1990 World Values
Survey, which asked voters twenty issue questions, making it a uniform data source for all
advanced industrial countries. The answers to those questions are taken as indicators of the
parties' appeals to voters; hence, unlike the other works reviewed here, Kitschelt treats the farright parties primarily as parties-in-the-electorate rather than party organizations or groups of
leaders. This method helps to make the link from party to voters but it tends to leave the content
of party programs or ideology and the intentions of leaders and activists unexplored. Further,
reliance on the World Values Survey limits the analysis in certain ways: to the issue areas tapped
by the questions included in the survey; to voter attitudes on set questions rather than the salience
of the issues to them; and to a snapshot of conditions in 1990 rather than over a longer period.
For Kitschelt, as for many of the radical-right parties in Western Europe, the French Front
National is an exemplary case, not only because of its dramatic electoral success but because of
its virulent combination of political appeals. Indeed, the Front National embraced neo-liberalism
by 1981, calling for lower taxes, less state intervention, and a major reduction in state
bureaucracy, and the party's anti-immigrant positions and racism became prominent in the early
1980s. In its policy on European integration, where market economics and nationalism are
generally in conflict, the Front National compromises by accepting the European Union but
demanding "a Europe of the nations," on a federal basis rather than via supranational
authorities.

24

Although it accepts the political system of the Fifth Republic, the party tends

toward socially conservative positions, opposing abortion and feminism (though it favors family
allowances and a maternal wage), and favoring a strong state, including the death penalty.
Authoritarianism or social conservatism in the new-radical-right parties complement free-market
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economics; both the traditional family and the market should encourage individuals to work hard
and subordinate their personal desires. Self-employed people and blue-collar workers are
represented disproportionately in the Front National's electorate, as are men and those with less
education, all groups which are relatively neo-liberal or xenophobic or both.
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It is not clear, however, if any parties other than the Front National, such as the Danish
and Norwegian Progress Parties, fit the new-radical-right type. Kitschelt's multi-variate analysis
of Danish Progress Party support shows that market liberalism and authoritarianism are both
significant factors, although racism is the strongest factor in the analysis, and that no traces of
libertarianism can be found; the Danish Progress Party's voters tended to respect authority and
reject participation in demonstrations, women's rights, and postmaterialist values, though not to a
greater extent than Conservative voters.

26

Yet among the questions used to construct the neo-

liberalism factor reveals, there were no questions on social spending.

27

Others find that the Danish Progress Party and its voters on balance supported the welfare
state.

28

Although the Progress Party proposed tax cuts, they were intended for the lower, not the

upper, strata; in parliament, the Danish Progress Party helped to pass government budgets
maintaining social programs which favored lower-income groups while reducing their tax
burdens in 1989 and 1990.

29

Support for social spending seems relatively firm in Denmark, even

among radical-right voters who prefer less state and more market competition in other areas. On
other issues, too, the Danish Progress Party does not seem to fit the new-radical-right type.
Eurobarometer data shows its voters are also much more accepting of democracy and value
liberty no less than the supporters of other parties, and much more than far-right voters in France,
Germany, and Italy.

30

The upshot is that if data other than the World Values Survey are
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considered, the degree to which the Danish Progress Party could be characterized as neo-liberal
and/or socially conservative is open to question.
Although law-and-order and xenophobic positions have been important to the radical
right, not all of these parties rely on them. The Italian Northern League and the Austrian
Freedom Party break from the new-radical-right model in important respects and can be
classified as populist anti-statist parties. While, as Betz stresses, all radical-right parties are
populist in the sense of attacking the political class, the Austrian and northern Italian far-right
parties rely largely on populist appeals such as opposing state bureaucracy. The Northern
League's program and voters emphasize anti-corruption and pro-efficiency measures and call for
privatization of state enterprises; the party benefits mainly from a negative coalition against the
established parties and their practices of public-sector patronage. Populist anti-statist parties are
not strongly socially conservative, and do not strongly or consistently oppose left-libertarian
positions. Thus, while xenophobia has been crucial to many other radical right-wing parties, and
recently has become more important to the Austrian Freedom Party, the Northern League used
the issue only until about 1992 and then mainly as part of attacks on national political elites. The
Northern League's reliance on broad anti-statist appeals attract a broad electorate, in which no
occupational groups are strongly overrepresented.
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Welfare-chauvinist parties represent still a third sub-type of radical-right party, somewhat
closer to neo-fascist parties; the Republicans in Germany form the only obvious major example.
Welfare-chauvinist parties make socially conservative and racist appeals to voters, but depart
from other radical-right parties in defending the welfare state -- although, of course, immigrants
are to be excluded from welfare-state protection.
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Their combination of appeals makes them more similar to neo-fascist parties than the
other radical-right parties are, but are welfare-chauvinist parties actually neo-fascist? The
Republicans occupy a gray area between radical and neo-fascist parties, although any
assessments of proximity to neo-fascism are difficult and apt to be controversial. Their activists
are divided between radical and pro-Nazi wings, resulting in compromises and contradictions
within and between the parties' programs and speeches. Their nationalism verges on being antisystem, since they want Germany restored to the borders of 1937, though that presumably would
mean breaches of international treaties and war. Like more overtly neo-Nazi parties in Germany,
the Republicans subtly attempt to defend the Nazi regime, e.g. by using National Socialist terms
such as "deutsches Volk" and "Lebensraum." On the other hand, they take a compromise
position on European integration similar to that of the Front National. The Republicans have
also verged on opposition to the present democratic system; their 1987 program attacked
pluralism and called for subordinating group interests to the national interest, e.g. by restricting
labor unions and putting the mass media under the control of new public authorities. In the early
1990s, their racism and anti-semitism, especially in campaign speeches and advertising, was
obvious enough -- for example, referring to the main Jewish interest group in Germany as "the
fifth occupying power" -- to trigger nationwide surveillance by the Germany's Federal Office for
the Protection of the Constitution.

32

Explaining far-right party success
While far-right parties have gained dramatically in many West European countries since
the 1980s, there have been important differences in their levels of success (see Table 1). The

16
most successful have been the Front National in France and the Freedom Party in Austria, which
averaged 11-16% in national parliamentary elections during 1980-95. Next come a group of
relatively successful parties, which have gained 6-9% of the national vote. This group clearly
includes parties in Italy, Denmark, and Norway. The third group, of marginally successful
parties, has averaged 2-4% of the vote and includes cases which are difficult to classify. The
Swiss Automobilists Party (an anti-environmental party) and the Flemish Bloc struggled in the
mid-1980s (and hence averaged only 4% for the 1980-95 period), but they may have moved into
the relatively successful group with their strong showings (5-8%) in the early 1990s. The
Swedish New Democracy has campaigned only since 1991 and has been erratic, as have the
Republicans; they reached a 7.1% peak in the 1989 European elections, then struggled around
2% in national elections in 1990 and 1994, yet have scored high and stable results (9-11%) in the
populous region of Baden-Württemberg in the 1990s. Finally, and by contrast, far-right parties in
Britain and the Netherlands have been unsuccessful, with the British National Front and the
Dutch Center Democrats averaging less than 1% of the national vote. All of the successful
parties gained their first significant levels of support during the 1980s or '90s, except the Italian
Social Movement (which was strong in the 1950s) and the two Progress Parties (which arose in
the early 1970s, declined in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and then resurged in the late 1980s).

-- Table 1 about here --
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Table 1: Electoral Support for Far-Right Parties in National-Level
Parliamentary Elections in Western Europe, 1980-1995 34
Country

Party

Average
support
1980-95

Peak
support
post-1970

Year of
peak

First
year
at 5%

MOST SUCCESSFUL:
Austria

Freedom Party

16.1% 21.9% 1995

1986

France

Front National

10.7

12.7

1993

1986

RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL:
Italy

Northern League

8.6

8.7

1992

1992

Norway

Progress Party

6.8

13.0

1989

1973 &
1989

Denmark

Progress Party

6.5

9.0

1988

1973 &
1988

Italy

Italian Social
Movement/
National Alliance

5.9

6.8 &
13.5

1983 &
1994

1953

MARGINALLY SUCCESSFUL:
Sweden

New Democracy

4.0

6.7

1991

1991

Switzerland

Automobilists'
Party

3.9

5.1

1991

1991

Belgium

Flemish Bloc

3.8

7.8

1995

1991

Germany

Republicans

2.0

2.1

1990

----

Netherlands

Center Party/
Center Democrats

1.0

2.5

1984

----

Britain

National Front

< 1.0

0.6

1979

----

UNSUCCESSFUL:

All results are popular vote shares in those national parliamentary elections
which were contested by the party through December 1995; presidential and
European Parliamentary elections are excluded. Average figures for the Italian
Social Movement and the Center Party cover only 1980-92.
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Why have radical-right parties gain at the polls since the early 1980s? Why have they been
more successful in some countries than in others? Besides the four hypotheses mentioned earlier,
below I will assess four additional explanations proposed by Betz and Kitschelt. First, there have
been important changes in the context of West European politics in the last thirty years. Increased
international economic competition and the crisis of the welfare state have made left-right issues
salient and neo-liberal positions attractive, especially for workers and employees in the private
sector and for self-employed people.

35

Moreover, changes in occupational structures and

communications due to the transition from industrial to post-industrial society have undermined
traditional political cleavages as well as increased voters' general disaffection from established
parties.

36

Second, where mainstream parties have converged on economic issues, far-right parties

have opportunities to recruit voters via strongly neo-liberal positions.

37

Third, the far-right parties must adopt optimal appeals if they are to take advantage of the
opportunities which the mainstream parties afford them. Since the far-right parties draw on
diverse, cross-class social bases, they require diverse appeals (usually neo-liberalism plus
nationalism and authoritarianism) in order to do so successfully.

38

Parties which fail to adopt neo-

liberal positions, because of their ideological commitments or organizational connections with
neo-fascists, will sacrifice votes. Fourth, the specific mix of appeals which is optimal for a radicalright party depends on its political context. When partyocracies, which Kitschelt defines as "the
fusion of state, party, and economic elites in politico-economic networks characterized by
patronage, clientelism, and corruption," fall into crisis, challenging parties do best if they use a
diffuse anti-establishment message rather than authoritarianism or xenophobia.

39
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The crisis of the welfare state

The welfare-state thesis receives support not only because of

the importance of neo-liberal appeals and the timing of the far right's recent success, but also from
cross-national correlations. Where there is no large welfare state, there has been no major backlash
against the welfare state, and so there is no potential demand for neo-liberalism to the right of the
center-right parties. For example, in countries where economies are not post-industrial and large
welfare states do not exist (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland), radical-right parties are not at all
successful.

40

In multivariate regressions, Swank and Betz also find that per capita GDP are

predictors of far-right voting success.
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Similarly, Taggart has found moderate correlations

between far-right party voting and indicators of welfare-state decommodification.

42

The political construction of immigration issues There is a link between immigration and farright parties' success, but it is an indirect one. Hence, two qualifications of the immigration thesis
are necessary. First, radical-right parties did not begin to succeed in the 1980s until they
discovered that concerns about immigration could benefit them at the polls. The immigration issue
was not simply made by the fact of ethnic diversity or immigrant influxes, but could only arise and
benefit a far-right party if that party could dominate the construction of the issue. This occurred
much earlier (1983) in France than in other countries which faced similar objective problems with
immigration, such as Germany. Second, immigration and other issues appealing to xenophobia are
only part of a larger package of policies in which neo-liberal economic policies are typically key
ingredients. Indeed, overreliance on the immigration issue and neglect of other issues, especially
neo-liberalism, has hampered far-right parties in Britain and Germany.
Immigration to Western Europe, initially from Asia and Africa and then from Eastern
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Europe and the former Soviet Union, increased sharply during the mid-1980s, a trend which
continued after the collapse of communism in eastern Europe led to economic crisis and civil
conflict in several countries. Betz argues that this immigration -- against a background of rapid
social change and economic insecurity -- has spurred increased xenophobia, and, in turn,
xenophobes became strong supporters of the far right.
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In fact, the first of these links is supported by opinion surveys. During 1989-91, there was
a sharp increase, from about 45% to about 60%, in most West European countries in the number of
respondents agreeing with the statement that there are "too many foreigners" in their country.

44

Moreover, the shares of non-EU populations correlate highly with levels of xenophobia across
West European countries.
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But the link between xenophobia and far-right party success is much

less clear. There is little correlation between far-right-wing voting and either popular xenophobia
or immigrant shares.
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For example, far-right parties have done better in some countries with low

shares of foreign-born population (Italy, Austria, Denmark, Norway) than in some countries with
relatively many foreigners (Germany, Britain).
In part, this is because even where xenophobia is high, overreliance on immigration issues
is not a reliable basis for building a far-right party, as seen by the case of the Republicans. On
issues of immigration and competition for housing and jobs, and only on these, the Republicans'
voters had more confidence in their party than in the other parties in 1989, showing the party's
heavy reliance on the issue.
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Moreover, Republicans' voters are distinguished from Christian-

Democratic voters mainly in their responses to questions concerning their acceptance of a neighbor
of a different race or nationality, or whether members of their own nationality should have priority
in the labor market. The Republicans, like their predecessors on the far right in Germany, gained
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dramatically when they enjoyed something like a monopoly on these issues.
But the party was vulnerable to changes in the salience of immigration issues and the other
parties' credibility on them. After its 1989 surge in support (which occurred only several months
before the Berlin Wall was breached), Chancellor Kohl's leadership of German reunification left
the Republicans unable to regain the offensive, even though the party had strongly promoted
reunification in the mid-1980s. The Republicans rose again in state-level elections in 1992, during
a crisis concerning Germany's relatively liberal right to asylum, but declined once more in the 1994
national elections, after the major parties had adopted a constitutional amendment to restrict the
asylum right the previous year.

Fascist legacies and far-right party strategies

The neo-fascist explanation of the far-

right parties' success can be almost completely rejected. There is widespread agreement that
radical parties have been much stronger and dynamic than parties which are closer to fascist
legacies.
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Parties with neo-fascist elements (the Republicans, the National Front, and the Italian

Social Movement) are relatively unsuccessful electorally; the Republicans failed to get over 2%
nationally after 1989, and the National Front got a negligible vote share after 1979. Conversely,
the greatest successes of far-right parties, in France and Austria since the 1980s and in Denmark
and Norway in the 1970s, were linked to strong neo-liberal elements in their parties' programs and
appeals to voters. The main exception to this correlation is the Italian Social Movement, but that
party was in decline during the 1980s and gained in 1994 only because the center-right and centerleft parties collapsed in the wake of massive scandals and prosecutions of party leaders for
corruption.
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Indeed, organizational and ideological continuities with fascist parties have inhibited the
success of far-right parties. The Republicans could not take neo-liberal positions because, as
Kitschelt argues, Germany's small but virulent network of neo-Nazi sects and clubs interfered with
vote-maximization. Whenever a far-right party has gained votes in postwar Germany, neo-Nazi
militants are attracted to the party, not least because of the strong chances of gaining local offices
in the decentralized governmental system. The new activists pull the party toward neo-fascist
positions and spoil its reputation among prospective voters. This process befell the briefly
successful National Democrats in the 1960s and also the Republicans after its striking gains in
1989.
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As militants joined, power struggles ensued and party leaders could not keep the party on

a radical rather than neo-fascist course. Neo-Nazi militants had at first supported Franz
Schönhuber's takeover of the Republicans leadership in 1985, soon after he had published the
memoirs of his experiences as an SS officer, but later Schönhuber was cast in the role of trying to
hold together moderate and neo-Nazi factions; evicted as the Republicans leader by neo-fascists in
50

1990, he returned to his old position later that year but was ousted again in 1994. The
Republicans' intraparty conflicts clearly hurt the party at the polls, and the specter of neo-Nazism
within its ranks has limited its potential support.
Similarly, the Italian Social Movement's explicit links to fascism have made it difficult for
the party to gain far-right, neo-liberal voters like the Northern League has. Even though this party's
voters responded to its use of neo-liberal appeals in 1990, the party's electoral strength was still
stagnant. Apparently, the Italian Social Movement's neo-fascist reputation made it difficult for the
party to credibly assert neo-liberal positions.
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While neo-fascism is reliably linked with electoral failure, there is at least one exception
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which suggests that the potential for anti-system and even neo-fascist parties depends on the
salience of nationalist issues in West European countries. The Flemish Bloc in Belgium makes
regionalist, xenophobic, anti-welfare-state, and anti-gay and anti-abortion appeals.
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In these ways,

it fits the new-radical-right type. However, the party also has important connections to the neofascist right in Flanders, which originated in groups which collaborated enthusiastically with the
Nazi occupation during World War II. When the neo-fascist paramilitary group Flemish Order of
Militants, which had strong international contacts with neo-Nazis, was banned in 1983, some of its
members went to the Flemish Bloc, where they may have helped move the party toward antiimmigrant positions.
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The Flemish Bloc has made overt appeals to neo-Nazis by calling for an

unconditional amnesty for Nazi collaborators, and its leader has expressed nostalgia for the Nazi
occupation.
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Furthermore, many the Flemish Bloc's nationalist statements verge on anti-system
positions. In the 1990s, the party's main campaign issues have been extremely nationalist: calls
for an independent Flemish state with its capital in Brussels; the slogan "Our own people first,"
and calls to deport immigrants. The party also calls for recovering lost Flemish territory and
bringing together all Flemish people in one independent state. Yet the importance of extreme
nationalist issues to the party's recent gains is difficult to assess. The party's voters are attracted
mainly by its anti-immigrant message, which is prominent in its campaign literature; 66% of its
voters said that the immigration issue was the main reason they voted for the Flemish Bloc.
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Despite the Flemish Bloc's neo-fascist ties and pro-welfare-state positions, the party does
not fit the pattern of marginal success which most scholars predict for such parties. The Flemish
Bloc is at least a relatively successful far-right party, gaining about 6% of the national vote in 1991
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and 1994, after struggling in the 1980s, and with 10-12% of the vote in the Flanders region.
What might account for the Flemish Bloc's greater success compared with the
Republicans? The economic crisis has been unusually long and severe in Belgium, the country's
linguistic divisions have remained major sources of potential conflict, and political elites tried to
accommodate those divisions via constitutional reforms in the 1980s which actually gave new
resources to Flemish nationalists.
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This suggests an unsettling conclusion: if mainstream parties

allow nationalist issues to become polarized enough, anti-system and even neo-fascist parties
might do much better at the polls than they have in most West European countries in the post-war
period.

Political alienation

Clearly, increased political alienation is not the entire explanation for

far-right success. Far-right parties make more specific campaign appeals and attract voters with
more distinct ideological profiles -- neo-liberal, socially conservative and xenophobic, or both -than would be expected if they were purely protest parties. But does political alienation play a role
in far-right voting? Voters who say they are dissatisfied with politics are more likely than other
voters to endorse far-right parties.
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Yet this strong association between distrust and far-right

voting leaves open the question of causation. Since the parties put out a "distrust" message, voters
may have chosen to vote for the far right for other reasons (e.g. neo-liberalism, racism) and then
have answered political-trust questions in ways which conform to the parties' positions.
Evidence at the cross-national level, however, also suggests that increased alienation has
played a role. Various measures of general political alienation -- such as disbelief that politicians
are interested in citizens' opinions, disbelief that politicians care about people, distrust in
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parliament, dissatisfaction with democracy, declines in party membership, weakening party
identifications, and falling voting turnout -- show that some countries have experienced major
increases in alienation since 1975 while others have not. France and Sweden had experienced
clear declines in political trust by 1990, while Germany and Italy experienced sharp crises in the
early 1990s.
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On the other hand, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Britain, and the Netherlands did

not have clear declines in political confidence after 1975, at least through 1990. The first group of
countries, those with strongly increasing political alienation, has averaged much lower levels of
far-right voting than the second group.

59

Moreover, most of the anomalies are easily explained.

Germany had rising political alienation yet weak far-right voting, because the Republicans did not
capitalize by adopting neo-liberal positions. Denmark and Norway had increases in far-right
voting despite mostly stable levels of political alienation in the 1980s, but in both cases, political
alienation had risen sharply to high levels in the early 1970s, when it was associated with a major
increase in voting for the Progress Parties.

Mainstream party strategies and crises in partyocracies Political alienation is also related to
the degree of convergence between the major left- and right-wing parties of government on
economic issues.
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This accords with one of Kitschelt's main arguments: that convergence among

the major conservative and left-wing parties is necessary before a far-right party can use radical
neo-liberal agenda to attract many voters. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between mainstream
party convergence and far-right party success.
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Where mainstream parties have advanced neo-

liberal policies (e.g. Britain, the Netherlands), the far right has done poorly.
The Front National has been particularly adept at exploiting the mainstream parties'
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convergence and loss of credibility, initially through by using secondary, low-stakes elections to
gain media attention. In the mid-1970s, the conservative government of Giscard d'Estaing moved
to the center, as did the Socialist Party in 1983, soon after it had finally become the party of
government. Moreover, in the 1980s, the center-right was increasingly fragmented and its neoliberal wing was led by Chirac, a leader identified with the statist policies of the Gaullist party.
Hence the mainstream parties lacked credibility on neo-liberal economic issues and the Front
National was able to step into a gap. A strong result for the Front National in the first round of the
Dreux municipal elections in 1983 was followed by a successful electoral pact with the center-right
parties for the second round and then a national debate among conservatives about whether to ally
with the radical anti-immigrant party. This debate boosted the popularity of the Front National,
even though the ultimate result was that the established parties usually did not join forces with the
Front National. The Front National's vote took off in the 1984 European Parliamentary elections
and the 1986 Assembly elections.
Kitschelt also illuminates far-right voting in cases of great political alienation and
mainstream party convergence, where countries have been governed by "partyocracies." As
education levels have risen, middle-class, white collar voters have demanded political participation
and transparent government; their demands, together with the extraordinary degree of left-right
convergence by mainstream parties in Austria and Italy and the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, have led to a crisis of confidence in these partyocracies. In such
cases, far-right parties can attract a broad cross-section of voters with appeals to anti-statist
attitudes, and hence the far right does better if it tones down its xenophobic and authoritarian
messages, which tend to alienate centrist voters.
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For example, the Northern League did quite well at the polls without relying much on antiimmigrant appeals because it benefitted from widespread attacks on the Italian patronage system in
the late 1980s. In this environment, the Northern League did well in regional elections in 1989.
This gained the party much publicity, which, although largely negative, linked the party to its main
issue of opposing corruption.
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Poised for success, the Northern League experimented with a mix

of issues. Initially it used xenophobia, targeted at southern Italian migrants, as a way of criticizing
the political establishment; after the 1991 elections, the party began to drop its xenophobic appeals
but continued its success.

Anti-left-libertarianism
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The final thesis of the single-case literature, of a backlash against

left-libertarian parties, has received little attention. Yet the thesis has been supported in several
ways. It is consistent with the argument that the new right-authoritarian parties help to define an
axis of political conflict between themselves and left-libertarians.
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Moreover, there is a strong

cross-national correlation between left-libertarian and radical-right parties. Further, in all cases
except France and Finland the ecological parties preceded the radical right. In the outlier cases, or
where a long lag has intervened between the emergence of the two opposing parties, it can be
explained in terms of the strongly neo-liberal positions of mainstream parties (e.g. in Sweden, the
Netherlands) or the integrative capacities of left-center parties (e.g. in France).
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The relation of right-wing nationalism and authoritarianism to left-libertarianism deserves
more study. In the cases where both movements are strong or weak, do the two movements tend to
develop in parallel simply because they are shaped by the same party systems, welfare states, and
post-industrial occupational structures? Or have the far-right parties reacted directly to the left-
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libertarian parties and political agenda, as Minkenberg suggests?
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Do the ecological and radical-

right parties address similar issues in each country? Does the radical right directly attack the leftlibertarian parties or movements, or rather the mainstream parties for making policy concessions to
the libertarian left?

Conclusions
Radical-right parties are likely to remain political factors past the turn of this century.
Continued economic insecurity in a context where foreign residents are a fixture and women's
rights and environmental protection have influential advocates will likely continue to lead to
resentment and occasional races to find scapegoats, races which may be won by far-right parties as
often as by the mainstream parties. Should the perceived failures of the political establishment
continue cumulating, disaffection from all political parties will remain at high or even rising levels,
providing opportunities for all kinds of outsider parties. Most far-right parties are not dependent
on the immigration issue and hence cannot be permanently undercut by the maneuvering of
mainstream parties on it. Even if their current issues should fade or be captured by the established
parties, the continued presence of left-libertarian groups, parties, and issues in most West European
countries might provide new targets to vilify. As long as most voters are moderates, the
mainstream parties will have strong incentives to remain centrist and leave their fringe voters to
the far right.
Yet the continued success of far-right parties is not inevitable, since favorable structural
conditions are necessary but not sufficient for their success. Political interactions between the farright parties and the established parties, and even between factions within the far right, influence
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their prospects, at times decisively. Where they benefit from a current revulsion against
partyocracies, as in Italy, they may not survive the political establishments against which they
rebel. Where they ride the immigration issue, they risk being repeatedly outmaneuvered by the
mainstream parties. Where fascist parties were strong in the interwar period, they risk being
swamped today by neo-fascist activists who interfere with vote-maximization. And if they
continue to be successful and gain an aura of respectability, they may be invited to join in
government, which would rob them of their apparent innocence and might require skillful
leadership to avoid destructive conflicts between neo-liberal and authoritarian representatives of
these parties' diverse electoral bases. Since they operate in democratic societies, the far-right
parties have a degree of internal democracy, which together with diverse activist bases can result in
sharp internal conflicts when a party is unsuccessful, like the British National Front, or when its
successes create spoils in the form of party finances and public offices, like the German
Republicans.
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In general, the nature of contemporary electorates seems to dictate that far-right parties'
electorally optimal position between the center-right parties and anti-system positions. But this
pattern suggests potential dangers for democracy, too. Parties like the Front National, the
Republicans, and Flemish Bloc, even if themselves "merely" radical, seek radical policy changes
which go some distance -- how far has not been adequately and dispassionately studied -- toward
extreme nationalist and authoritarian agendas. If the overall background conditions for politics
should change dramatically, e.g. via economic crisis or regional war, the far right could become a
much more effective conduit for the transmission of anti-system ideas and political forces into the
political mainstream. Hence especially the borderline cases such as the Flemish Bloc call for
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further analysis of the nature of the parties and the causes of their success. To understand better
the nature of the far-right parties, further research should employ sharp conceptual tools and a
variety of approaches in order to focus on the extent to which these parties accept or reject
democracy, market capitalism, and the existing state system. A greater variety of indicators and
data sources would also help in assessing the parties' likely trajectories, especially where activists'
commitments diverge from the appeals to which voters are responding. The party as an
organization of activists as well as the party-in-the electorate need to be examined, and the two
need to be related to each other.
Finally, the works reviewed here suggest that the process of issue definition, e.g. regarding
immigration and citizenship policies, should be investigated dynamically. Since large numbers of
foreigners will certainly remain in Western Europe, far-right parties will have chances to raise
issues related to them and to benefit from doing so. The interactions among parties and voters, and
between factions within far-right and mainstream-right parties, could be analyzed. What does it
take for a party to gain credibility as the organization most trusted to solve a public problem, or,
inversely to discredit the governing parties on an issue? Do timing and tactics affect whether a farright party or mainstream party wins this contest? How is such credibility, or distrust, reproduced,
and for how long? Does it make much of a difference for public policy if mainstream parties
succeed in coopting such issues (as in Britain and Germany) instead of playing catch-up (as in
France)? Can counter-mobilization by pro-immigrant groups and multi-cultural policies by
government inhibit and not just spur xenophobic voting? These questions, along with the
conceptual and methodological tools suggested here, might be profitably applied especially to the
cases, like the Republicans, the Flemish Bloc, and the Italian National Alliance, where parties
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which stand closer to neo-fascism have had some success, in order to explore the current limits of
far right-wing politics in Western Europe.
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